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Abstract. One of the most difficult, yet interesting change in the 
seventeenth-century natural philosophy was that of chemistry. This essay 
focuses upon Cartesian re-evaluation of the philosophical disciplines, 
arguing that, from a systematic perspective, chemistry cannot find a place in 
natural philosophy. Chemistry, in its seventeenth-century form of 
“chymistry” shares a number of common features with other traditions and 
practices. Descartes and his first-generation of followers discussed in this 
essay – Jacques du Roure, Robert Desgabets, and Jacques Rohault – will 
react precisely to this discipline of “chymistry,” opposing it to their physics 
built on a combination between theory of matter and mechanical 
explanations. The very restrictive Cartesian theory of matter will come into 
tension with any intermediate explanatory entity, such as the chymical 
principles. This essay will investigate such tensions, arguing that they are 
caused by both ontological and epistemological commitments. For example, 
the principles of the chymists contradict the one material extension of the 
Cartesian world. At the same time, Cartesians require a more thorough 
reductive process then the one provided by chymical explanations. In this 
sense, chymistry is good for practical purposes, but fails in providing an 
explanation in natural philosophy and, hence, to represent a science. 
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Introduction 
On April 15, 1630, Descartes confessed to Mersenne: “I am now studying 
chemistry and anatomy simultaneously; every day I learn something that I cannot 
find in any book.”1 It is a period when Descartes was interested in observations and 
experiments. He begun studying anatomy only recently, as his correspondence with 
Mersenne from December 18, 1629 testifies –  “je veus commencer a estudier 
l’anatomie” – something which remained of a constant interest over his entire life.2 
His addition of chemistry to the study of anatomy reflects the disciplinary changes 
in the medicine of his time. Traditional Galenic medicine was in the process of 
transformation under the influence of Paracelsian views. The reform of medical 
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practice – from Paracelsus to the mid-seventeenth century physicians – coincided 
with a new emphasis on experiment and observation. Thus, the preparation of 
curative medicines (chymiatria) was joined with anatomical observations and general 
medical practice. Allen Debus refers to this situation, in claiming that “by 1700 
many of the most prestigious medical faculties of Europe had chairs either of 
chemistry or of Galenic and chemical pharmaceutical preparations.”3 
  Chemistry was, thus, a needed tool for medical studies and the analogy 
between chemical analysis and medical anatomy became a common locus in the 
literature. For example, one can find such statement expressed in Nicaise Le 
Febvre’s treatise: 
 
as the Anatomist doth make use of Rasors and other sharp Tools in his 
Dissections, to separate the better the several parts of the human body, 
which is his chief object: The same doth the Chymical Artist, fetching his 
instruction from Nature it self, to attain his end, which is nothing else but 
to joyn homogeneal and separate heterogeneal things by the means of Heat.4 
 
The connection between chemists and physicians is a recurrent topic in the 
seventeenth century, where anatomy (“ana-tomy”) and chemistry (“ana-lysis”) were 
taken to represent the same activity of “cutting open” the bodies.5 If dissection 
provides the anatomist with a straightforward view of how organs are disposed in 
the body, chemical analysis is supposed to reveal the hidden principles. However, 
the laboratory practice of “resolution” needed a background theory to explain the 
outcome of chemical process. This seemed to be achieved with Paracelsus’ 
explanation in terms of three principles – salt, sulphur, and mercury.6 The influence 
of this theory over the seventeenth-century thought can hardly be overestimated as 
it shaped many of the disciplinary debates of the period with an alternative view to 
the Aristotelian theory of four elements. Of a great interest for what follows is how 
Paracelsian  tria prima  and subsequent developments in seventeenth-century 
chemistry were discussed in the Cartesian philosophical context. However, my aim 
is not to explore the transformation of early modern alchemical and chemical 
practices and the theories generated by them, but to discuss the reaction of some 
self-identified Cartesian philosophers (not chemists) to  the problem of chemical 
explanation in natural philosophy.7 
  Bernard Joly and Luc Peterschmitt have recently discussed the relation 
between Cartesian philosophy and chemistry.8  Exploring the uneasy problem of 
how chemical phenomena are being treated by Descartes and some of his followers, 
Peterschmitt, but especially Joly, made it clear that answering the problem of the 
status of chemical objects within Cartesian natural philosophy is a pressing one. If 
both authors were mainly interested in reconstructing hidden chemical themes in 
Cartesian philosophy, I shall try in this essay to explore the problem from a different 
perspective. Thus, I shall attempt to address the problem of the disciplinary status 
of chemistry in the context of Cartesian philosophical system. For this, I shall rely  
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mainly on Descartes’ classification of the philosophical disciplines in the Principia 
philosophiae, taking his natural philosophy to represent a system build on the theory 
of matter and mechanical explanations. As Steven Gaukroger has argued: 
 
Part II of the Principia deals with the foundational principles of Descartes’ 
physical theory, which take the form of a synthesis of matter theory and 
mechanics. . . . Mechanics deals with physical processes in terms of the 
motions undergone by bodies and the nature of the forces responsible for 
these motions. Matter theory deals with how the physical behaviour of a 
body is determined by what it is made of, and in the seventeenth century it 
typically achieves this in a corpuscularian fashion, by investigating how the 
nature and arrangement of the constituent parts of a body determine its 
behaviour.9 
 
However, Luc Peterschimtt expresses the clash between Cartesian 
mechanicism and chemistry, concluding that “Chemistry presents a problem for 
mechanism; indeed, chemistry turned mechanism into a problem, because chemistry 
is a limit for mechanism. . . . chemistry reveals that mechanism is a scientific 
ideology, extending concepts and models of explanation outside of their realm.”10 
What were the philosophical reasons of Cartesians to reject chemistry? And even 
more important, what was the realm of chemistry at the discussed moment? 
Peterschmitt does not say; instead, he uses “chemistry” with reference to a well-
established discipline that only later takes shape. Thus, his conclusion requires more 
investigation, due to the status of chemistry as a seventeenth-century discipline. 
Established on new bases by Antoine-Laurent Lavoisier at the end of the 
eighteenth century, chemistry had a traditional culture of laboratory practice that 
was further supplemented with new theoretical developments.11  A number of 
scholars investigated the fate of chemistry in the seventeenth century, revealing the 
intricate connections between medicine, alchemy, physics, and metallurgy.12 
Newman and Principe convincingly argued that seventeenth-century forms of 
chemistry should be described by the term “chymistry.”13  However, what is 
important to notice regarding this discipline is that in spite of this large variety in 
meanings, it was commonly described as an art dealing with the dissolution and 
composition of bodies. Such definition was under circulation up to 1694, when the 
first edition of the Dictionnaire de l’Académie française  was issued and the term 
“chymie” was described as “the art of reducing the bodies to their constitutive 
principles by means of fire.”14 
In the French context, chymistry was practiced in the new scientific 
institutions of the Jardine du roi and the Académie des science. Practitioners, such 
as Christophe Glaser worked on “Les Mysteres de la Chymie,” which covered 
pharmaceutical and alchemical themes. In fact, Glaser was very optimistic in stating 
that “ce bel Art” of chymistry is able to “see clear in all that is most hidden in 
Nature.”15 But there is something more than a good practice of chymical analysis  
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that is needed. Mi Gyung Kim stumbled upon the problem of the transformation of 
chemistry in the seventeenth century, arguing that what was required was “a new 
philosophical language, one less hermetical and more in tune with natural 
philosophy, rather than a disciplined practice, to become a ‘science’.”16 However, 
adopting the language of natural philosophy is not a simple task and besides the 
change of taxonomy, it also implies a deeper transformation of the discipline. In my 
case study of early-Cartesian reaction to chymistry presented here, I shall point out 
how chymistry is analysed in terms of the type of explanation it can provide. From 
this perspective, the relation between chymistry and physics is the most important. 
Furthermore, by picking up Stephen Gaukroger’s distinction between theory of 
matter and mechanics, I shall argue that the initial philosophical reaction of 
Cartesianism to chymistry mainly originated in the role ascribed to the matter 
theory. 
Both mechanics and chymistry are very broad disciplines, suffering great 
transformations in the discussed period, which is why I shall try to keep a close 
focus on the systematic considerations about the two. Moreover, I shall restrain my 
analysis to  a narrow time-frame (roughly between 1640s and 1670s) and to 
philosophers (Descartes and some of his first-generation followers), rather than 
chymists. Various scholars already discussed how Cartesian taxonomy is joined with 
seventeenth-century chymistry (e.g., Nicolas Lémery or Wilhelm Homberg) allowing 
for the establishment of a Cartesian chemical philosophy.17 But this happens only 
later and with only one notable exception, Pierre-Sylvain Régis, the authors involved 
are all chymists. Hence, my approach draws attention to another problem, which 
should provide the study of such late Cartesians with a needed tool in furnishing an 
explanation of the disciplinary transformations of natural philosophy. 
 
Descartes and chymistry 
In his recent book on Descartes et la chimie, Bernard Joly remarks that one can 
find two types of Cartesian texts regarding chymistry: “on the one hand, those 
where he criticises the alchemists, their practices and doctrines, on the other hand, 
those where despite his hesitations, he deals with chemical objects.”18 Joly is mainly 
interested in the later, for which he finds support in various passages from Les 
meteores and the third and fourth parts of the Principia philosophiae. However, there is 
another type of text, where Descartes is interested in chymistry from a systematic 
perspective. 
While various small references to “chymistry” can be found in Descartes’ 
correspondence from the 1630s, a more direct approach is taken in 1644, when he 
published the Principia and in the correspondence of the year after this book has 
been printed. Thus, on July 7, 1645, Constantijn Huygens confessed to the French 
philosopher that he was “becoming more and more attracted to the anatomy of 
things.” Something developed further in the letter, when he claims that: 
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as far as the mechanical industry can extend on doing things, the chymical 
operations being the most obvious ways for taking advantage of this, it is a 
long time since I wanted to hear you speaking about these, to see in how 
little nomenclature you include so many waters, salts, oils, essences, spirits, 
and at least other superfluous chimerical differences that these good people 
present us in their laboratories.19 
 
Huygens’ request for a thorough description of the operations of chymistry 
reveals the connection with practice. The mystery of chymical operations seems to 
be at stake and Huygens expresses his belief that Descartes is able, not only to 
explain them, but also to achieve this with a very economic taxonomy. His 
enthusiasm about this topic is obvious and in the final part of the letter he invites 
Descartes to “spare some time in order to share” what he discovered about it. 
Descartes’ answer was not waited for long. Thus, on August 4, he replied: 
 
I’ve had trouble deciding to send you this letter without attaching any 
discourse involving chymistry, as you have expressed your desire; for there 
is nothing I would not willingly do in order to obey you, provided I was 
capable. But having already written all the little I knew on this matter, in the 
fourth part of my Principles, where I have discussed the nature of minerals 
and that of fire, and of all different effects that can almost be attributed to 
chymistry, it is impossible for me to write anything more, without risking 
myself to mistake, because I have not made the experiences which would 
have been necessary for me to come to the particular knowledge of each 
thing, and not being easy to perform them, I am renouncing to this study 
and to all the other similar ones, because I cannot complete them without 
help; and there are still plenty of other experiences I can solve without the 
help of others . . .20 
 
What we can learn from this epistolary exchange is of a great importance 
for the topic of this essay. First, we can observe that both Descartes and Huygens 
understood chymistry in the way described above, as a sort of “anatomy of things.” 
Second, Descartes suggests to his correspondent that he had already dealt with this 
issue in the fourth part of his Principia. And third, Descartes complains about the 
lack of possibilities in performing all the necessary experiments required to get a 
complete understanding of the chymical operations. However, despite the latter 
shortcomings, Descartes is confident in his prior explanation of the subject matter. 
But what  does one discover about this topic, if looking at the last part of the 
Principia? 
  
 
 
Mihnea Dobre - Cartesianism and chymistry 
  126 
 
Figure 1: The formation of minerals in the bowels of the earth.21 
 
The number of passages where Descartes deals with the principles of the 
chymists are not that many.22 Yet, his views can easily be inferred from them. A 
direct discussion is made in the fourth part of the Principia, paragraph 63, where 
Descartes provides an explanation of how metals are produced in the mines. And he 
does this by reducing the chymical principles to mechanical ones: 
 
And I’ve explained here three types of bodies that seem to me to have a 
strong connection with those that chymists often take as their three 
principles, which they call salt, sulphur, and mercury. For we can take these 
corrosive juices for their salt; these small branches composing an oily 
matter for their sulphur, and quicksilver for their mercury. And my view is 
that the true cause for the production of metals in the mines is that these 
corrosive juices flowing here and there in the pores of the body C, are such 
that some of their parts are detached from others, which thereafter, being 
wrapped and as if covered by small branches of oily matter, are easily 
pushed from C to E by the parts of the quicksilver, when it is agitated and 
rarefied by heat. And accordingly to their various sizes and figures of these 
parts of the body C, they form different types of metals, which perhaps I 
should have had explained in more detail here, if I would have had the 
possibility of making all the experiences required to verify the arguments I 
have made on this subject.23 
 
The mechanical explanation is similar to what Descartes said in various 
other places of his natural philosophy. What is however interesting in this passage is 
that Descartes goes beyond  the regular chymical explanation, comparing the 
chymical principles to mechanical interactions between various aggregations of 
matter. If the resolutive process of revealing the principles is reduced to the physical  
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explanation in terms of hidden mechanisms, the principles of the chymists fall into 
Descartes’ dissolving world of corpuscles. Just like any other body of his world, the 
tria prima is just an intermediary aggregation of matter that can be further divided 
and decomposed in terms of mechanical relations between smaller bodies.24 This 
view on the status of chymistry is not singular. Descartes has already expressed it in 
a letter to Mersenne from July 30, 1640, where he reacted to Mersenne’s description 
of a different set of three principles.25  Showing some knowledge of the topic, 
Descartes explained the principles of the chymists in terms of different forms and 
arrangements of parts of matter. In fact, he accuses the chymists of reaching wrong 
conclusions because of their “fausse imagination.”26 Instead, his explanation makes 
appeal to the three ‘elements’ presented in his natural philosophy, which are nothing 
more than various arrangements of res extensa. Thus, ‘elements’ fill in the middle-
ground between his theory of matter and the mechanical world of macroscopic 
bodies. This way, his move from the large, visible bodies, to their small, insensible 
constituents comes into tension with the chymical alternatives developed at that 
time. 
  However, the letter to Huygens discussed above confirms Descartes’ 
indecision in providing a clear-cut rejection of the chymical principles. What seems 
to be required is an empirical refutation of chymistry, because theory – Descartes’ 
theory of matter –  makes the three chymical principles irrelevant for natural 
philosophy. Caught between practice and theoretical corpus of physics, this tension 
has further produced troubles to seventeenth-century Cartesians. 
 
Cartesians and Chymistry 
An early follower of Descartes, Jacques Du Roure published his La Physique 
in 1653. This is a book inspired by Descartes’ natural philosophy, but at the same 
time, discussing other philosophical views. In his attempt to provide a complete 
textbook on physics, Du Roure addresses the problem of the composition of bodies 
accordingly to the chymists  (“la composition des Corps suivant les Chimistes”). He 
begins with the general observation that “it is very difficult to define these 
Principles” and continues by listing the important contribution of chymistry to 
“Pharmacy, Medicine, and the Philosophical Stone.”27  Du Roure seems to be 
acquainted with new developments in chymistry, as he refers to Sennert, Severinus, 
Beguin, and Duchesne.28 While the view expressed by Du Roure resembles other 
seventeenth-century claims about the usefulness of chymical practice in various 
aspects of life, he adds a critical comment about the possibility of chymistry as a 
science: 
 
[these principles] are not that general to explain the large number of bodies 
and of their effects . . . these Principles are difficult, obscure & by 
consequence useless in establishing a proper science. To understand that 
more clearly, one has to consider first, the uncertainty of their nature, of 
their qualities & of their number. . . . Secondly, one has to consider the  
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infinity of species contained by these Principles. . . . Finally, one has to take 
into account the agreement claimed by the chymists [for their Principles] 
with the Elements & the Principles of Aristotle, the history of Genesis 
where they see that Moses does not discuss about Salt, Sulphur nor 
Mercury; at last, the Fables of the Poets in which after some dreams they 
think to have found the secrets of their Doctrine & of their Art.29 
 
Du Roure’s clear rejection of chymistry is not the only case we can find 
among Cartesians and it is in fact a turning point in the formulation of arguments 
against chymistry by a first generation of Cartesian natural philosophers. According 
to this passage, chymistry fails when it comes to its Principles. For du Roure, 
chymistry is a “Physique Resolutive,” which should reveal the hidden constituents 
of bodies. Not its operations are questioned here – above, we have seen Du Roure 
praising it for the useful results – but its explanatory possibilities, especially when it 
comes to the elucidation of the structure of bodies. Theory of matter is the one 
questioned by Du Roure when he mentions the Aristotelian elements and chymical 
principles. While this opposition in terms of matter theory will produce other stirred 
debates, for the time being, the problem is more whether or not to call “chymistry” 
a science.30 
  Another follower of Descartes, Dom Robert Desgabets touches the same 
problem in his Le guide de la raison naturelle (c. 1671). While, he was more concerned 
with the problem of philosophical sects –  especially  with the relation between 
Cartesianism and Gassendism – Desgabets refers to the chymists. His words are 
revealing: 
 
As for the chymists, although one cannot blame nor despise their 
experiments, still has to accept that they do not treat philosophy by its first 
principles and they happily agree to be taken as servants, without claiming 
the glory that is reserved to the party leaders. I do not need to talk about 
Paracelsians, Fluddists, nor Helmontians, because their schools are only apt 
to receive the dregs  of philosophy and make the meeting place for 
dreamers.31 
 
For Desgabets, seventeenth-century chymistry cannot be a science, as it 
only deals with practice, not with the ultimately constituents of nature. In turn, 
dealing with the problem of the nature of matter is the domain of natural 
philosophy. Physics studies the matter theory that stays at the very basis of science. It 
reveals the ontological structure of the world, providing explanations of the 
phenomena discussed by natural philosophy. 
  By the same time when Desgabets was writing these harsh words against 
chymistry, another important Cartesian was printing his textbook on physics. After a 
few decades of experimental working, the Parisian Cartesian, Jacques Rohault, 
published in 1671 his Traité de la physique. In this very influential book, Rohault  
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spends some time to reject “the elements of the chymists.”32 The discussion follows 
after his remarks on the Aristotelian theory of elements, which is equally rejected: 
 
I cannot tell whether these or such Reasons, induced the Chymists to reject 
those Elements which the Antients would have introduced; thus much is 
certain, that they had proposed others very different. And in order to 
establish them; as they profess an Art which consists principally in using 
Fire after different manners, to separate as much as is possible, the different 
Parts of which different Bodies are composed, they have pretended, that 
this Resolution is the only Way to find out what are the true Elements 
which Nature makes use of in the Composition of Bodies; as the taking a 
Machine to Pieces, is the only way to find out what it is composed of.33 
 
Besides the earlier attacks against chymistry – which we have discussed in 
the cases of Descartes, Du Roure, and Desgabets –  Rohault adds here a 
methodological objection. His description of the method employed by the chymists 
– “this Resolution is the only Way to find out what are the true Elements which 
Nature makes use of in the Composition of Bodies” – already contains the reasons 
to reject it. In his view, if experiment and observation seems to lead to some states 
of matter (principles or elements), what chymists present as their principles cannot 
be properly described as such. A principle is not an empirical fact, but part of the 
theory. Rohault’s scientific methodology, with its emphasis on both theory and 
experiment has a hypothetico-deductive structure. In science, experiment is not “the 
mere simple using our Senses,” nor when one “deliberately and designedly make 
Tryal of any Thing, without knowing or foreseeing what will come to pass,” but 
only when observations “are made in Consequence of some Reasoning in order to 
discover whether it was just or not.”34 We can infer from here that, for Rohault, the 
chymical operations fall under the second type of experimentation: they are 
examinations of the possible mixtures that constitute a body, yet, their so-called 
principles are not well founded.  
Moreover, he reminds of du Roure’s comments on the same topic: the 
resolutive method which uses fire will raise some problems when attempting to 
recreate a mixture that was split into its composing parts, making the two operations 
of chymistry not compatible one to the other. Besides, each of the Principles has 
various species, which means that, rigorously speaking, the number of chymical 
elements will increase. Resembling his comments on the “occult qualities” of the 
scholastics, Rohault claims that chymists hasten in giving names to things that are 
not well known.35 Yet, he defends the chymical practice: 
 
I should think it a great piece of Injustice not to give the Chymists that 
Commendation which is due to their Industry and laborious Application. 
Without doubt the whole World, and the Philosophers particularly, are very 
much obliged to them for the Pains they have taken, and which they  
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continue to take, to make a great Number of Experiments, whereby they 
come to the Knowledge of diverse Properties of many different Things.36 
 
Rohault finds good reasons to rely on the results of the chymists, not only 
because they provide useful substances –  especially in pharmacy –  but also for 
revealing some of the hidden features of the natural world.37 Thus, he continues the 
argument: “This gives them opportunity to find out and discover the Nature of 
Things, and at the same time, serves for a Rule to try the Truth of their Principles 
by, and to justify their Reasoning and the Consequences which they draw from 
thence. However, I think their manner of treating of Philosophy is not satisfactory, 
nor their Elements such as ought to be allowed.”38 Combining the appreciation of 
chymical practice with the disdain for their theoretical foundation, Rohault picks up 
the side of the natural philosopher: experiment and observation should be employed 
to test the hypotheses, but the entire theoretical corpus belongs to natural 
philosophy. Despite the alleged ‘principles’ of the chymists, Rohault does not allow 
them to interfere with the ontological commitments of physics. For him, matter 
should be explained only in terms of extension, to which one has to apply 
mechanical laws in order to grasp all natural phenomena. 
  At the same time, it should be noted that Cartesian natural philosophy 
postulates underlying causes for the observed phenomena. The effects of the visible 
interactions between bodies are explained in terms of hidden corpuscles. Rohault is 
aware of this difficulty when he claims that: “What good do those long and nice 
Disputes do, about the Divisibility of Matter? For though it could not be accurately 
determined, whether it be infinitely divisible or no; it would be sufficient to know, 
that it can be divided into Parts small enough to serve for all Purposes that can 
be.”39 Why not then accepting a chymical explanation in terms of three (or five) 
principles? As long as the principles of chymistry are conceived as mid-level 
ontological entities, mechanical division and chymical resolution look the same. 
Moreover, since the Cartesians largely adopted Descartes’ view that bodies can be 
indefinitely divided, it is impossible to get a reduction all the way down to the ultimate 
constituents. In this sense, chymical elements can offer the same explanatory power 
as any corpuscular theory of elements. The problem is then how to observe these 
intermediary entities, not to mention that everything existing beyond them will stay 
hidden. As another Cartesian of the late seventeenth century, Bernard Lamy, has 
noticed: “One must recognize however that in a great many things, even with the 
aid of the microscope, pneumatic machines and chemistry, we still cannot penetrate what 
Nature had decided to conceal from us. We do not see what is inside. What can a 
physician do, therefore, except conjecture?”40  No instrument can make the full 
reduction so that the structure of matter cannot be empirically grasped. Instead, a 
scientific method, similar with the one encountered in Rohault, will make the 
relation between theory –  with its postulated entities –  and observation, more 
meaningful. 
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Concluding remarks 
My aim in this essay was to add another layer to the current debates about 
the relation between Cartesian philosophy and chymistry. If chymical phenomena 
and objects were studied in the recent scholarship, I have attempted to look at this 
relation from a disciplinary perspective. Thus, my interest was in the way in which 
Descartes, du Roure, Desgabets, and Rohault understood chymistry with respect to 
the system of natural philosophy. What is important in this sense is how Descartes 
and his followers changed the disciplinary boundaries of the traditional scholastic 
philosophy. As Gary Hatfield convincingly argued, 
 
Aristotelian physics was a general science of nature, subsuming not only the 
basic natural kinds, but also the subject-matters of what we might call 
physical astronomy, chemistry, biology, physiology, and psychology. (. . .) 
Descartes, then, regarded physics as a general science of nature, not as a 
discipline restricted to the analysis of body and the laws of motion, and his 
readers and followers understood the term in the same way.41 
 
Natural philosophy (physics) becomes the exemplary science to which all 
the other disciplines are subordinated. Physical theories and practice take 
philosophical form. It is a process that will eventually happen with chymistry only 
that not in the context of the early Cartesianism represented here by Descartes and 
his first-generation followers. For the Cartesians discussed here, chymistry is still an 
Art (in the traditional sense), which means that its resolution is a real process, which 
ultimately destroys the body. Both du Roure and Rohault claimed that chymical 
practice fails when it comes to recreate the body that was split into its constitutive 
principles. For them, chymistry destroys its subject in the search for its (three) 
ultimate elements, which, after all, are various aggregations of the same res extensa.42 
  The cases of Cartesian philosophers, discussed here, are exemplary for this 
re-evaluation of natural philosophy under the form of mechanical philosophy. The 
clash between mechanics and chymistry reveals other important problems. On the 
one hand, the relation between theory and practice is once more discussed. 
Traditionally, alchemy and early modern chemistry were connected with preparation 
of medicines and transmutation attempts. In this sense, mechanics – which is not far 
from the science of engineering and craftsmanship – comes to represent the “pure” 
science of the two, on the basis of its reliance on the theoretical core of the natural 
philosophy. On the other hand, the clash between the two disciplines is relevant 
from the point of view of the type of explanation involved. Mechanics – in the form 
of Cartesianism – requires the existence of its stipulated invisible components of 
matter. Although chymistry seems to require a similar explanation, it fails short in 
providing one, just as we have seen in the passages from Du Roure and Rohault 
discussed above. In this sense, Luc Peterschmitt’s conclusion – “chemistry presents 
a problem for mechanism; indeed, chemistry turned mechanism into a problem, 
because chemistry is a limit for mechanism” – is only partially true.43 The conflict  
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between the two disciplines occurs in the final decades of the seventeenth century; 
mechanics and chemistry clashed in such a way that various authors were either 
trying to make chemistry more mechanical or to incorporate mechanics into 
chemistry.44  However, at the time when Descartes and a first generation of 
Cartesians were writing their philosophical corpus, chemistry could not represent a 
limit for mechanism as it was still “chymistry,” a discipline under development. On 
the contrary, mechanical explanation seemed to cover all the phenomena and 
everything needed was an account in terms of motion of corpuscles. Robert Boyle 
reached a similar conclusion in his Origin of Forms and Qualities: 
 
And  though the Unsatisfactoriness and Barrennesse of the School 
Philosophy have perswaded a great many Learned Men, especially 
Physicians, to substitute the Chymists Three principles, instead of those of 
the Schools; and though I have a very good opinion of Chymistry it self, as 
’tis a Practicall Art; yet as ’tis by Chymists pretended to containe a Systeme 
of Theoricall Principles of Philosophy, I fear it will afford but very little 
satisfaction to a severe enquirer, into the Nature of Qualities. For besides 
that, as we shall more particularly see anon, there are Many Qualities, which 
cannot with any probability be deduc’d from Any of the three Principles; 
those that are ascrib’d to One, or other of them, cannot Intelligibly be 
explicated, without recourse to the more Comprehensive Principles of the 
Corpuscularian Philosophy. To tell us, for instance, that all Solidity proceeds 
from Salt, onely informing us, (where it can plausibly be pretended) in what 
materiall principle or ingredient that Quality resides, not how it is produced; 
for this doth not teach us, (for example) how Water even in exactly clos’d 
vessels comes to be frozen into Ice; that is, turn’d from a fluid to a Solid 
Body, without the accession of a saline ingredient.45 
 
Even if this passage refers mainly to the problems found by physicians in 
their application of Aristotelian theory of elements and their attempt to replace it 
with chymical principles, it sheds light for the way in which corpuscular philosophy 
is viewed. For Boyle – as for all the Cartesians discussed above – only the later can 
provide such general principles to reveal the secrets of nature. The rest fails to make 
the passage from art to science. 
From the point of view of the history and philosophy of science, we can 
conclude that the episode of scientific transformation discussed here provides 
insights into the debates concerning the ontology and epistemology that shaped the 
formation of modern science. The theory of matter advocated by natural philosophy 
clashes with the tria prima of the chymists. The new emphasis on experiment one 
can find in the seventeenth century fails short in deciding between mechanics and 
chymistry, as both of them are conceived to deal with “the anatomy of things.” 
However, the open rejection of chymistry in the works of Cartesians points out one 
of the important features in the constitution of modern science. Our scientific  
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model of explanation is built upon the one produced by Descartes and his followers. 
Ontological and epistemological commitments are linked together in a coherent 
whole, combining the use of hypotheses, experimentation, and, from one moment 
onward, mathematization. Thus, chymistry had to transform itself into chemistry in 
order to be recognized as a science. 
 
Acknowledgments.  This work has been supported by the strategic grant 
POSDRU/89/1.5/S/62259. I thank Christoph Lüthy and the anonymous referees 
of this journal for suggestions and comments. I am also grateful to the participants 
in the Bucharest-Princeton Seminar on Early Modern Philosophy (2010) for helpful 
comments on an earlier draft. 
                                                            
References 
1 Descartes, R., Œuvres de Descartes, eds. Ch. Adam & P. Tannery (Paris: J. Vrin, 1964-1974), 
11 vols., AT hereafter. English translations were taken, where available, from The Philosophical 
Writings of Descartes, trans. J.  Cottingham, R.  Stoothoff, and D. Murdoch (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1984),  2 vols., (hereafter  CSM); with a third volume on 
Descartes’ correspondence, translated by J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, D. Murdoch, and A. 
Kenny (1991), (hereafter CSMK). If no English edition is indicated, the translation is mine. 
See AT I, 137; CSMK 21. 
2 For Descartes’ letter to Mersenne from December 18, 1629, see AT I, 102. For Descartes’ 
interest in the study of anatomy, see his letter to Mersenne from November 13, 1639 (AT II, 
621). 
3 See Debus, A. G., “Chemists, Physicians, and Changing Perspectives on the Scientific 
Revolution”, Isis 89 (1998): 77. For a discussion of the relation between chemical-medicine 
and natural philosophy in England, see Anstey, P., “The Matter of Medicine. New Medical 
Matter Theories in Mid-Seventeenth-Century England” in Vanishing Matter and the Laws of 
Motion. Descartes and Beyond, eds. D. Jalobeanu & P. Anstey (London: Routledge, 2011), 61-79. 
4 See Le Febvre, N., A Compleat Body of Chymistry (London, 1664), 19, quoted in Newman, 
W., “The Chemical Revolution and its Chymical Antecedents (Review Essay)”, Early Science 
and Medicine 13 (2008): 179. 
5  It is interesting to notice the common use of the figure of Democritus, who was 
considered both the father of anatomy and of chemistry. Moreover, Democritus, the 
atomist, was an equally important figure for seventeenth-century theories of matter. For a 
thorough discussion of the image of Democritus in the early modern period, see Lüthy, C., 
“The Fourfold of Democritus on the Stage of Early Modern Science”, Isis 91 (2000): 443-
479. 
6  See Debus, A.  G.,  The French Paracelsians: The Chemical Challenge to Medical and Scientific 
Tradition in Early Modern France (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
7 For some studies of the relation between alchemy, chemistry, and theories of matter in the 
seventeenth century, see Clericuzio, A., Elements, Principles, and Corpuscles. A Study of Atomism 
and Chemistry in the Seventeenth Century (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000) and 
Lüthy, C., Murdoch, J. and Newman, W., (eds.), Late Medieval and Early Modern Corpuscular 
Matter Theories (Leiden: Brill, 2001).  
 
 
Mihnea Dobre - Cartesianism and chymistry 
  134 
 
8 See Joly, B., Descartes et la chimie (Paris: Vrin, 2011) and Peterschmitt, L., “The Cartesians 
and Chemistry. Cordemoy, Rohault, Régis”, in Chymists and chymistry: studies in the history of 
alchemy and early modern chemistry, ed. L.  Principe (Sagamore Beach, MA: Science History 
Publications, 2007), 193-201. 
9 Gaukroger, S., Descartes’ system of natural philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002), 93-94. 
10 See Peterschmitt, L., (2007), 201. 
11 For the evolution of chemistry in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, see Kim, M. 
G., Affinity, that elusive dream. A genealogy of the Chemical Revolution (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
MIT Press, 2003). 
12 See Newman, W., “From Alchemy to Chymistry”, in The Cambridge History of Science. Vol. 3: 
Early Modern Science, eds. K. Park & L. Daston (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2008), 497-517; Principe, L., ed., Chymists and chymistry: studies in the history of alchemy and early 
modern chemistry (Sagamore Beach, MA: Science History Publications, 2007); Newman, W., & 
Grafton, A., eds., Secrets of Nature. Astrology and Alchemy in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2001); Debus, A., (1998). 
13 See Newman, W. & Principe, L., “Alchemy vs. Chemistry: the etymological origins of a 
historiographic mistake”, Early Science and Medicine  3 (1998): 32-65.  A similar view is 
expressed in Joly, B., “Chimie et mécanisme dans la nouvelle Académie royale des sciences: 
les débats entre Louis Lémery et Etienne-François Geoffroy”, Methodos 8 (2008). 
14  See  Le dictionnaire de l’Académie françoise  (Paris: J. Coignard, 1694), vol.1,  189: “Art de 
resoudre les corps en leurs principes par le moyen du feu.” 
15 Glaser, C., Traité de la chymie (Paris, 1672), unpaginated preface: “voit clair dans tout ce que 
la Nature a des plus cache.” 
16 Kim, M. G., (2003), 4. 
17 See for example Mouy, P., Le Développment de la physique cartésienne: 1646-1712 (Paris: J. Vrin, 
1934), 175 and Joly, B., (2011), 175-217. 
18 Joly, B., (2011), 59: “d’une part ceux où il critique les alchimistes, leurs pratiques et les 
doctrines, d’autre part ceux où, malgré ses réticences, il traite des objets de la chimie.” 
19 The entire passage is: “Si vous me permettez, Monsieur, de tourner ce feuillet, j’ajouterai 
que, depuis votre Philosophie aucunement comprise, je deviens de plus en plus amoureux de 
l’anatomie des choses. Et pour autant que l’industrie mécanique y peut aller, les opérations chimiques étant 
les plus apparents moyens d’en tirer de l’avantage effectif, il y a longtemps que je brûle d’envie de vous en 
entendre discourir, pour voir en combien peu de nomenclature vous comprenez tant d’eaux, de sels, d’huiles, 
d’essences, d’esprits, de magistères et autres différences chimériques au moins superflues, que ces bonnes gens 
nous installent en leurs laboratoires” (AT IV, 243-244). 
20 “J’ai eu de la peine à me résoudre de vous envoyer cette lettre, sans y joindre quelque 
discours touchant la chimie, ainsi que vous avez témoigné le désirer; car il n’y a rien que je ne 
fisse très volontiers pour vous obéir, pourvu que j’en fusse capable. Mais, ayant déjà écrit 
tout le peu que je savais touchant cette matière, en la quatrième partie de mes Principes, 
lorsque j’y ai traité de la nature des minéraux et de celle du feu, et de tous les divers effets 
auxquels se peut quasi rapporter toute la chimie, il ne m’est pas possible d’en rien écrire 
davantage, sans me mettre en hasard de me méprendre, à cause que je n’ai point fait les 
expériences qui m’auraient été nécessaires pour venir à la connaissance particulière de chaque 
chose; et n’ayant point la commodité de les faire, je renonce dorénavant à cette étude et à 
toutes les autres semblables, touchant lesquelles je ne pourrais entièrement me satisfaire sans  
 
 
Society and Politics                                                            Vol. 5, No. 2(10)/November 2011 
        135 
 
l’aide d’autrui; car il m’en reste encore assez d’autres, auxquelles je n’ai besoin que de moi 
seul, pour occuper agréablement le reste de ma vie” (AT IV, 260-261). 
21 See Descartes, R., Principia philosophiae (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1644), 226. 
22 For a detailed discussion of Descartes’ treatment of chymistry in the Principia IV, see Joly, 
B., (2011). 
23 “63. Des principes de la chimie, et de quelle façon les métaux viennent dans les mines. 
Et j’ai ici expliqué trois sortes de corps qui me semblent avoir beaucoup de rapport avec 
ceux que les chimistes ont coutume de prendre pour leurs trois principes, et qu’ils nomment 
le sel, le soufre et le mercure. Car on peut prendre ces sucs corrosifs pour leur sel, ces petites 
branches qui composent une matière huileuse pour leur souffre, et le vif argent pour leur 
mercure. Et mon opinion est, que la vraie cause qui fait que les métaux viennent dans les 
mines, est que ces sucs corrosifs, coulant çà et là dans les pores du corps C, font que 
quelques-unes de ses parties se détachent des autres, lesquelles par après, se trouvant 
enveloppées et comme revêtues des petites branches de la matière huileuse, sont facilement 
poussées de C vers E par les parties de l’argent vif, lorsqu’il est agité et raréfié par la chaleur. 
Et selon les diverses grandeurs et figures qu’ont ces parties du corps C, elles composent 
diverses espèces de métaux, lesquelles j’aurais peut-être ici plus particulièrement expliquées, 
si j’avais eu commodité de faire toutes les expériences qui sont requises pour vérifier les 
raisonnements que j’ai faits sur ce sujet” (AT IXb, 235-236). 
24 For the various problems induced by Descartes’ view concerning the essence of matter, 
see Dobre, M., “The Vanishing Nature of Body in Descartes’s Natural Philosophy”, in 
Vanishing Matter and the Laws of Motion. Descartes and Beyond, eds. D. Jalobeanu & P. Anstey 
(2011), 11-30. 
25  See  AT III,  130-131. For a more detailed discussion of Descartes’ reference to 
“principles” and the use of “elements,” see Joly, B., (2011), 86-98. 
26 See AT III, 130-131. 
27 See Du Roure, J., La Physique, Art. 4 LI-LII (Paris,1653), 41-43. 
28 Besides these names, in his Dessein d’une institution universelle, du Roure gives a slightly 
different list of authors one should consult in the study of chymistry: “Pour la Chimie, 
Crollius, Beguin, Declave, Davissone, Glauber & Barlet. C’est par les principes de cet Art 
que Paracelse, Quercetan, Fabri, & Helmont ont taché d’expliquer la Medecine à laquelle 
servent les Auteurs qui traitent ou des Plantes comme Dioscoride, Theophraste, Mathiole, & 
Bauhin: ou des Metaux comme Agricola, Caesius, le Cosmopolite, & quelques autres Auteurs 
que le Theatre Chimique contient: ou des Animaux comme Aristote, Aldovrandus: ou enfin 
de toute la nature comme Pline.” See Du Roure, J., Dessein d’une institution universelle: grammaire 
générale, nouveaux rudimens et nouvelles règles de la langue latine (Paris, 1661), 6-7. 
29  Du Roure, J., (1653), 41-43: “Il ne sont pas assez generaux pour expliquer le divers 
nombre des corps & de leurs effets . . . ces Princies sont dificiles, obscurs & consequemment 
inutiles à établir une veritable science. Pour entendre cela plus clairement il faut en premier 
lieu considerer l’incertitude de leur nature, de leurs qualitez & de leur nombre. . . 
Secondement il faut considerer l’infinité des especes que ces Principes contiennent. . . En 
dernier lieu il faut considerer l’acord que les Chimistes en pretendent faire aveq les Elements 
& les Principes d’Aristote, Aveq l’histoire de la Genese où ils voyent que Moyse ne parle ny 
du Sel ny du Soufre ny du Mercure: Enfin aveq les Fables des Poëtes dens léqueles apres 
plusieurs reveries ils pensent avoir trouvé les secrets de laur Doctrine & de leur Art.” 
30 For later debates about the status of chymistry in the context of French Cartesianism, see 
Joly, B., (2008).  
 
 
Mihnea Dobre - Cartesianism and chymistry 
  136 
 
31 See Desgabetes, D.R., Oeuvres philosophiques inédites IV: “La guide de la raison naturelle,” Ch. 
4 (Amsterdam: Quadratures, 1983-1985), 116(29-33), [e.81r-82v]: “Car pour les chimistes, 
quoiqu’on ne puisse blamer, ni mépriser leurs experiences, on est d’accord qu’ils ne traitent 
pas la philosophie par ses premiers principes et qu’ils doivent se contenter de passer pour 
des gens de service, sans pretender à la gloire qui est due aux chefs de partis. Je n’ai que faire 
de parler des Paracelcistes, des Fluddistes, ni des Helmontistes, parce que leur école n’est 
proper que pour recevoir la lie de la philosophie et pour être le rendez-vous des 
visionnaires.” 
32 See Rohault, J., System of Natural Philosophy, Illustrated with Dr. Samuel Clarke’s Notes, taken 
mostly out of Sir Isaac Newton’s philosophy (New York: Garland Publishing, 1987), vol.I, Part1, 
Ch. XX 1. 
33 Rohault, J., (1987), vol. I, Part I, Ch. XX 1, 108. 
34 Rohault, J., (1987), unpaginated preface. 
35 See for example Rohault, J., (1987), vol. I, Ch. XX 10, 110: “their Science extends no 
further than to give Names to things whose Natures they understand not.” 
36 Rohault, J., (1987), vol. I, Part I, Ch. XX 6, 109. 
37 In a similar manner, Christoph Glaser will claim that chymistry “est la clef capable d’ouvrir 
aux Physiciens la porte des secrets naturels, en reduisant toutes choses dans leurs principes.” 
See Glase, C., (1672), 3-4. 
38 Rohault, J., (1987), vol. I, Part I, Ch. XX, 109. 
39 Rohault, J., (1987), unpaginated preface. This passage is remarkably similar with Robert 
Boyle’s claim that Descartes and the atomists are saying the same things and all of them are 
describing corpuscles in motion. 
40 Lamy, B., Entretiens sur les sciences (Paris, 1683), 259 (emphasis added); quoted in Clarke, D., 
Occult Powers and Hypotheses (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 175.  
41 Hatfield, G., “Review Essay: The Importance of the History of Science for Philosophy in 
General”, Synthese 106 (1996): 113-138; 118. 
42 Note here that this is the point of view of the Cartesian philosophers. Since chymical 
analysis is considered to dissolve the temporary bond between elements, most of the 
seventeenth-century chymists would have argued for the reversibility of the process: the 
initial body can be recreated. 
43 See Peterschmitt, (2007), 201. 
44 See Joly, B., (2008) and Kim, M. G., (2003). 
45 Boyle, R., The Works of Robert Boyle. Vol. 5, eds. M. Hunter & E. Davis (London: Pickering 
& Chatto, 2000), 301 (emphasis added). 